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In our text we examme the relationship between practical wisdom and ethical states in
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The goal of our work is to define the function of practical
wisdom in ethical virtue. We gradually analyze the indiviual parts of definition of ethical
virtue from EN II, 6, that is, that virtue is a state concerned with choice which holds the mean
relative to us in such a way as a man of practical wisdom would define it. After the analysis
of state concerned with choice and practical wisdom we arrive at the determination of
practical wisdom as the source of virtuous action; only practical wisdom can be the criterion
that pronounces what is bad and good; desire in itself is not capable of deliberation.
Following from this a new question arises: how can practical wisdom influence the irrational
part of the soul, which is the seat of desire? Practical wisdom, having no direct influence on
desire, uses ethical virtue-temperance as it's intermediary. This induces in irrational desire the
intention to follow practical wisdom and thus practical wisdom becomes master of desire. We
see the contribution of our work firstly in defining the function of practical wisdom in
Aristotelian Ethics with greater accuracy and secondly in establishing temperance as a
neccessary condition of the other virtues and rational action itself.
